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DEMOCRATIZING JUSTICE IN THE POST-CONFLICT BALKANS:  
THE DILEMMA OF DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS 
 
Arnaud Kurze 
George Mason University 
 
Abstract 
Years of international and national accountability efforts in the former Yugoslavia 
have only partially helped post-conflict societies to transition. To complement 
retributive justice efforts more recently, human rights activists have launched a 
campaign to establish a regional truth commission. This article explores the intricate 
efforts among nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in several states across the 
region – particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia – to coordinate 
this movement. Drawing on participant observation and in-depth interviews, this 
study illustrates the movement’s struggle from within – caused by the conflicting 
interests of its members – and from outside, as it seeks support from international 
and region-specific organizations as well as national governments. While activists 
have remained unsuccessful in institutionalizing new truth spaces, this article argues 
that the state-centric strategy of human rights advocates during the campaign 
widened the gap between the activist leaders and victims’ groups, their principal 
supporters. 
 
Keywords:  post-conflict justice, truth commission, human rights activism, former 
Yugoslavia. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Throughout the 1990s the breakup of the former Yugoslavia led to horrendous 
conflict among the newly proclaimed independent states. Since, dealing with past 
war crimes and accounting for mass atrocities has constituted a very intricate and 
contentious process, mainly led by state-centric international retributive justice 
initiatives. In this context, the 1993 creation of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague constituted a watershed moment in 
international humanitarian law that lead to a global spillover effect.1 Within the last 
few years, an increasing number of national war crimes prosecution mechanisms 
have also been established, taking on transfer cases while The Hague Tribunal is 
winding down its activities. In fact, transitional justice processes in the Balkans 
relied primarily on international retributive justice mechanisms even while the 
conflict was still ongoing. This is quite different from other transitional countries 
that sought to address the issue of grave human rights violations in Latin America 
and Africa in the 1990s: in most cases, trials were deemed too risky to the newly 
                                                 
1  See for instance Ruti G. Teitel, “Global Transitional Justice,” Center for Global 
Studies Working Paper Series on Human Rights, Global Justice & Democracy, no. 8 (Spring 
2010). 
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established democracy or were simply off the table as a policy option due to 
negotiated pacts. Truth commissions, and sometimes amnesties, thus loomed large 
in the 1990s transitional justice lexicon. The ICTY put the issue of accountability 
after atrocity at the center of transitional justice debates.2 While the ICTY has made 
many important contributions to international law and without a doubt has 
reshaped transitional justice debates and practice, the Tribunal was only partly 
successful in its mission to help society in the post-conflict Balkans cope with past 
mass atrocity. In many ways, the justice processes that took place faraway from the 
site of the conflict in The Hague did not fulfill the needs of victims of the Balkan 
wars.3 As a result, almost two decades after the establishment of the ICTY, a series of 
truth-seeking initiatives have emerged across the former Yugoslavia to establish 
facts about the conflict that ravaged the Balkans and left 140,000 victims in its 
wake. 
 
These attempts, however, have been very elusive and problematic.4 I will draw on 
the most recent example, the Regional Commission for Establishing the Facts about 
War Crimes and other Gross Violations of Human Rights Committed on the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (RECOM), in order to illustrate the dilemma 
human rights activists were confronted with while launching their advocacy 
campaign for a truth commission. RECOM began as a grass-roots project in 2008 
and sought to provide more victim-oriented transitional justice projects and 
focused on the local needs of victims and their families to cope with past mass 
atrocities committed during 1991 and 2001. In other words, this regional fact-
finding movement was an attempt to democratize international humanitarian law—
and globalized human rights concepts more generally—in local post-conflict 
settings. Yet, since the beginning its founders have struggled to gain the official 
endorsement of international organizations and governments (in form of domestic 
laws that provide the legal foundation for the commission and financial resources, 
among others) to institutionalize their regional fact-seeking body.  
 
                                                 
2  See for instance Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007); John Hagan, Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War 
Crimes in the Hague Tribunal (University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
3  Eric Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 
4  See for instance Cécile Jouhanneau, “Les Mésaventures Des Projets De Commission 
Vérité Et Réconciliation Pour La Bosnie-Herzégovine (1997-2006): Une Étude De La 
Circulation Des Modèles Internationaux De Résolution Des Conflits Mémoriels,” in Le Passé 
Au Présent: Gisements Mémoriels Et Politiques Publiques En Europe Centrale Et Orientale, 
ed. George Mink and Pascal Bonnard (Paris: Michel Houdiard Editeur, 2010); Brian Grodsky, 
“International Prosecutions and Domestic Politics: The Use of Truth Commissions as 
Compromise Justice in Serbia and Croatia,” International Studies Review 11, no. 4 (2009): 
687–706. 
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This article explores the elusive efforts among NGOs in several states across the 
region – notably Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia and Serbia – to organize a 
transnational campaign to cope with past mass atrocities. Through participant 
observation and in-depth interviews, I examine how these NGOs discuss, interpret, 
and identify meanings of human rights and democracy within and across state-
boundaries of countries in the former Yugoslavia. My study reveals the movement’s 
struggle from within—caused by differing interests of its members—and from 
outside, as it seeks support from international and region-specific organizations as 
well as national governments. I explain why the NGO campaign for political-legal 
institutional change within the region of the former Yugoslavia has been 
unsuccessful thus far. 
  
Accordingly, I focus on the challenges of the legal influence on fact-finding 
processes. I analyze the ongoing political – and also legal-oriented – battle to 
institutionalize alternative transitional justice mechanisms. In fact, during the 
consultation phase to create a draft statute of the RECOM fact-finding body, the 
driving NGO forces of the campaign, particularly the Humanitarian Law Center, 
adopted a strategy that followed a state-centric logic, in order to gain support from 
governments and political leaders. As a result, the RECOM initiative employed 
lawyers to promote a legal-oriented and technical discourse at the expense of its 
primary target group of victims. I call this phenomenon the legalization of truth 
spaces. Against the backdrop of internal disputes and disagreements of its 
members, and the pressure from other sociopolitical actors in the region, I examine 
and discuss the problematic impact of this trend.  
  
The first section includes a review of theoretical issues in post-conflict justice 
scholarship on the Balkans, outlining the importance of strengthening research that 
focuses on state-society relations. It is followed by a description of the research 
design, qualitative research methods, and data selection procedures that this study 
is based on. Next, after briefly introducing the RECOM Initiative and its difficulties, I 
describe the early grass-roots discussions of RECOM’s mandate drawing on two 
local consultations in Knin, Croatia and Kruševac, Serbia. Then, in the subsequent 
section of this article, I rely on data collection of my participant observation of 
RECOM’s last regional forum on transitional justice in October 2010 before the 
RECOM campaign members finalized the draft statute in March 2011. This forum 
highlights the dilemma of NGO activists’ struggle to legitimize the commission at 
the state-level. I illustrate how, paradoxically, activists—in their effort to 
institutionalize the RECOM campaign—distanced themselves from their main 
support group, victims and victims’ families. Finally, I discuss some of the broader 
conceptual implications of this phenomenon and outline ideas for future research. 
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2. From State-Centric to State-Society Analysis: A Critical Review of the Literature 
 
Different forms of transitional justice mechanisms have been applied for millennia, 
especially in times of regime change, including Antiquity, the French Revolution, 
and after World War II.5  The scholarly debate around these issues and the term 
itself was in particular shaped by Ruti Teitel’s early work published in Neil Kritz’s 
edited volume Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes.6 Only a few years later, in 2000, Teitel published her 
groundbreaking book, Transitional Justice, in which she argues that the role of 
justice in political transitions is not a universal norm, but instead has a unique and 
constructivist character.  Grounding her research in legal analysis, she posits that 
“[l]aw is caught between the past and the future, between backward-looking and 
forward-looking, between retrospective and prospective, between the individual 
and the collective.”7 In her subsequent work she explores this concept further, 
providing a broad timeline of transition cases since 1945 in order to conceptualize 
political shifts and the role justice plays during these processes.8  
 
Teitel’s post-World-War-II genealogical work on transitional justice demonstrates 
how law and politics closely relate to each other. With her historical analysis she 
provides a synthetic and aggregative view, disclosing the changes of political 
institutionalization from the early trials after World War II, to the recent 
developments that have solidified the transnational justice phenomenon in a 
globalized world. As she precisely states: “The genealogical perspective situates 
transitional justice in a political context, moving away from essentializing 
approaches and thereby illuminating the dynamic relationship between transitional 
justice and politics over time.”9 Her article thus frames the changes in post-conflict 
societies from a legal perspective—discussing the effects of alternative models on 
international law and analyzing the impact of the rule of law in different contexts.  
 
Other authors have followed suit, studying transitional justice from a historical and 
institutional perspective.10 Jon Elster’s work Closing the Books: Transitional Justice 
                                                 
5  For a historical account on different forms of justice applied after regime changes 
see for instance Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
6  Ruti G. Teitel, “How Are the New Democracies of the Southern Cone Dealing with 
the Legacy of Past Human Rights Abuses?,” in Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 1995), 146–154. 
7  Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press, USA, 2000), 6. 
8  Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 
(2003): 69. 
9  Ibid., 94. 
10  For literature on institutional change during democratic transitions that has also 
influenced transitional justice scholarship see for instance Guillermo O’Donnell and Paul 
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in Historical Perspective, for instance, constitutes an account of different cases in 
history—ranging from Ancient Greece to the East German transition in the 1990s—
and provides a good example of expanding the institutional debate by scholarship 
on democratic transition in post-authoritarian and post-conflict justice contexts.11  
Both analyses are very valuable from a historical and comparative point of view. 
They help us understand institutional processes within political structures during 
regime change. Yet, neither one of them includes political processes between state 
and society actors, but its analytical lens remains focused on a state-centric view.  
 
While more recent transitional justice scholarship on the former Yugoslavia has 
provided excellent insights on the politics of justice, it still says very little about 
state society relations. As a case in point, Jelena Subotic’s Hijacked Justice: Dealing 
with the Past in the Balkans discusses the politicization of the ICTY’s compliance 
requirements of prospective European Union (EU) member states from the Western 
Balkans.12 Another scholar, Victor Peskin reasons along similar lines. In fact, Peskin 
compares state cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the ICTY.13 He argues that: 
 
[t]hese ad hoc tribunals can effectively become victor’s courts insofar as the winners 
of a conflict may be able to control a tribunal’s prosecutorial agenda. By the same 
token, the losers of a conflict may be able to control the courts by blocking 
investigations and prosecutions of their nationals. [… His] book focuses on two levels 
of such political activity beyond the courtroom: first, the political struggles and 
negotiations between tribunal, state, and powerful international community actors 
                                                                                                                 
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain 
Democracies (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Their edited volume provides different 
case studies on several political shifts and regime changes in the 1980s, focusing on Latin 
America. They explore different democracy models and political efforts to build democratic 
foundations in times of uncertainty. While Laurence Whitehead describes international 
factors in chapter one of the volume – discussing for instance foreign policy tools – other 
contributors, such as Adam Przeworksi, raise methodological questions, examining ways in 
which different data sets could be analyzed to help researchers better understand these 
processes. This type of literature concentrates especially on the sociopolitical factors of 
democratic transitions, including political institutions and in some cases the role of civil 
society during these processes. See also Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 
11  Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective. Both words 
are Latin and stand for comparisons and explanations. 
12  Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca, 
London: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
13  Viktor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and 
the Struggle for State Cooperation (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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that occur prior to as well as during the courtroom trials; second, the political 
struggles and negotiations within states.14 
 
More precisely, Peskin examines why state cooperation with the ICTR has decreased 
compared to a state cooperation increase with the ICTY over the years. For this, he 
analyzes various relationships between powerful actors, including judges, 
politicians, government representatives and diplomats, among others. His study, 
much as Subotic’s work focuses nonetheless on a state-centric perspective – 
mentioning civil society efforts only fleetingly15 – and therefore leaving the story of 
state-society relations in the dark. Both authors are part of a group of international 
relations scholars who have engaged in transitional justice research that emphasizes 
agency centered around states and international organizations as primary actors to 
implement international humanitarian law on the international and domestic level. 
Interactive processes and the sociopolitical dynamics between states and society are 
therefore of less interest to them. As Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder put it, 
“international relations scholars have a wealth of knowledge about the factors that 
shape the successes or failures of postwar reconstruction efforts and nation 
building.  Strategies of justice are one component of these frameworks.”16 
Dominant trends in the study of these phenomena remain visible, such as the heavy 
influence of legalism – which sets apart legal analysis from social or political 
sciences research17 – and an inclination to employ large data aggregation and 
quantitative studies in the literature.18  
 
On the contrary, this article aims at strengthening the sociopolitical research 
agenda of post-conflict justice. To this end, I analyze the importance of political 
objectives of different actors in transition contexts. In particular, I look at the 
relationship between the state (or its representatives) and society, characterized by 
                                                 
14  Ibid., 6. 
15  Ibid., 24. 
16  Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder, “Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of 
International War Crime Tribunals and Transitional Justice,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 7, no. 1 (2004): 359. 
17  Shklar in Kieran McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of 
Transitional Justice,” Journal of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (2007): 414. 
18  Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in 
Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace, 2010); David Backer, “Understanding Victim’s Justice: Evidence from Five Countries 
in African Countries,” in Conference “Accountability After Mass Atrocity: Latin American And 
African Examples In Comparative Perspective” May 6 (Washington, DC, 2009); Kathryn 
Sikkink and Carrie B. Walling, “Errors About Trials: The Emergence and Impact of the Justice 
Cascade” (Paper presented at the Princeton International Relations Faculty Colloquium, 
March 27, 2006). 
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civil society organizations.19 Several important political scientists have paved the 
way studying state-society relations in different contexts and eras, including Charles 
Tilly, Theda Skocpol, Barrington Moore, James Scott and Joel Migdal among others. 
A growing community of scholars are aware of the lack of research between politics, 
law and society, and decided to emphasize the process character of transitional 
justice phenomena in society using sociological and ethnographic tools to do so.20 
Moreover, several authors have explored the sociopolitical role of NGOs in society 
using a sociology-of-space perspective in order to illustrate their active involvement 
in shaping policy processes.21  
 
Drawing on Miraftab and Wills’ notion of invited spaces—more precisely, spaces in 
which state institutions provide opportunities for civil society to participate actively 
in certain problem areas—Alex Jeffrey recently analyzed the creation of space 
(invented space) by human rights organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to allow 
for deliberate conceptions of justice that go beyond legal institutions and 
processes.22 His study defies a legalist approach, illustrating how activists who 
initially cooperated with the judiciaries have established alternative ways to 
implement transitional justice in post-conflict settings. While I employ these 
concepts to investigate regional transitional justice activities of a number of NGOs 
across the former Yugoslavia in this article, I concentrate on the difficulties human 
rights activists are confronted with during the creation of these regional restorative 
justice efforts or truth spaces. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19  I focus on human rights organizations, excluding other advocacy groups, such as 
veterans’ organizations. For a discussion on the latter cf. Kurze, Arnaud and Iva Vukusic, 
“Afraid to Cry Wolf: Human Rights Activists’ Conundrum to Define Narratives of Justice and 
Truth in the Former Yugoslavia,” (forthcoming) in Olivera Simic and Zala Volcic, Transitional 
Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans (New York: Springer, forthcoming). 
20  Leigh Payne, Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth nor Reconciliation in Confessions 
of State Violence (Duke University Press, 2008); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: 
Transnational Justice In The Age Of Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); 
Jo-Marie Burt, “Guilty as Charged: The Trial of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori for 
Human Rights Violations,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 384; 
Cath Collins, “Grounding Global Justice: International Networks and Domestic Human Rights 
Accountability in Chile and El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies 38 (2006): 711–38.  
21  Faranak Miraftab and Shana Wills, “Insurgency and Spaces of Active Citizenship,” 
Journal of Planning Education and Research 25, no. 2 (2005): 200. For an extensive discussion 
on time and space, see John Urry, “Sociology of Time and Space,” in The Blackwell 
Companion to Social Theory (Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 416–444. 
22  Alex Jeffrey, “The Political Geographies of Transitional Justice,” Transactions of The 
Institute of British Geographers (2011). 
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3. Research Design 
 
Building on qualitative research methods, I portray a thick and in-depth picture of 
transitional justice processes, while also sketching and interpreting the politics that 
are at stake. Although I analyze the politics of justice from a political science 
perspective, I employ two qualitative analytical tools, one based on anthropological 
research and the other one relying on sociological analysis: participant observation 
and narrative interviews. I draw from over three-dozen interviews and two-dozen 
participant observations.23 The data was collected systematically, using snowball 
sampling, in which existing study subjects recruited future subjects from their 
acquaintances and professional networks. As for the observation of meetings, events 
and other activities, I selected a proportionate number of different settings, 
including local, national and transnational conferences. While most of them were 
public, some of them were also closed off to the public. These design choices were 
made according to Chaim Noy’s findings, who has illustrated that snowball sampling 
helps investigate social knowledge from particular sociopolitical groups' organic 
social networks and social dynamics.24 The strength of a mixed method qualitative 
approach is that scholars can use their “theoretical resources” to: i) analyze a small 
set of data in which context and change are crucial; ii) underline that coding plays a 
less important role, as data is dynamic and subject to change; and iii) “show how the 
(theoretically defined) elements we have identified are assembled or mutually 
laminated.”25  
 
Empirical evidence from my field experience during data collection procedures 
further corroborates the advantages of such a combined approach for my research 
question, including in particular feasibility, externality, and confidentiality.  In fact, 
my research project was limited to a specific time period and the studied 
community was not isolated from outside effects, but rather part of a larger social 
system. I followed and ‘lived’ with leaders and activists of human rights 
organizations during their daily activities across the region, reminiscent of the work 
of ethnographers who explore remote and indigenous tribes. However, it was not 
feasible to apply these participant observation techniques to all of the involved 
                                                 
23 The data was collected from September 2009 to October 2011. Interview 
participants include activists from principal human rights organizations involved in the 
RECOM Initiative in the selected country, such Documenta Center for Dealing with the Past 
(Croatia), Humanitarian Law Center (Serbia), Research and Documentation Center (Bosnia), 
among others. I observed staff meetings, consultations, forums and conferences associated 
with the fact-seeking efforts, among others. For a list of interviewees see Appendix. 
24 Chaim Noy, “Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in 
Qualitative Research,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11, no. 4 (2008): 
327–344. 
25 David Silverman, “Analyzing Talk and Text,” in Handbook of Qualitative Research, 
ed. Norman K. Denzim and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000), 828. 
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actors in transitional justice processes in the region. In order to reconcile the 
paradox of collecting sufficient information of different actors crucial to understand 
the dynamics I relied on additional open-ended informal and formal interviews with 
other key transitional actors to complement the constantly collected data through 
participant observation.  
 
Moreover, supplementing participant observation with interviews helped me 
overcome confidentiality issues. Indeed, while I became part of the community it 
occurred that information sharing through informal conversations revealed findings 
that were not meant for public use.26 Sometimes, the subjects specifically 
mentioned not to use certain types of information for research purposes, whereas 
other times, the right to use this information was stated more implicitly. To ensure 
that I could use all the gathered information during participant observation for my 
research purposes, I relied on periodical semi-structured interviews with the 
community members. The more formal character—as compared to the informal 
conversations and daily interactions with the members—allowed me to double-
check which information was available with the community’s consent. Any concerns 
that this self-censorship came at the expense of crucial research information that 
was not used anymore were ungrounded, as certain specific details did not always 
play an important role to understand the conceptual underpinnings of the social 
phenomenon under scrutiny. 
 
4. The Origins and Initial Challenges of the RECOM Process 
 
As mentioned above, recent attempts to institutionalize an interstate fact-finding 
body to account for past human rights violations and war crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia emerged as a response to the rising critique of international and 
domestic war crimes prosecutions in the region. Retributive justice mechanisms to 
cope with the past, such as the ICTY, have only partially fulfilled the goal of helping 
war-torn and post-conflict societies in the region transition. Some of the issues 
include: the geographical distance of the court between the Netherlands and the 
crime scene sites—which has often been condemned by victims and witnesses; the 
trying of selective cases only (both at the international as well as domestic level); 
and the politicization of cooperation processes between countries of the former 
Yugoslavia and the United Nations (UN) tribunal in The Hague.27 Increasing 
criticism from victim associations and human rights organizations were therefore 
crucial in helping launch an alternative process to deal with the past. The idea was 
that progress does not lie in more personnel, better strategies, and on-site presence 
                                                 
26 Here I refer to facts and information that cannot be found in public records or 
documents in hindsight. 
27 Ruti G. Teitel, “The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice,” Cornell 
International Law Journal 38 (2005): 837–862. 
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of the judiciary system, but in the way that those who suffered most during the 
conflicts are integrated into projects to cope with the past.  
 
The activities of several non-profit organizations—many of which often started 
working at the outbreak of violence in the early 1990s28 or shortly after—
demonstrate the increasing efforts to raise victims’ voices in transitional justice 
processes in the former Yugoslavia. In fall 2005, three established non-profit 
organizations in the region—the Humanitarian Law Center in Serbia, Documenta 
Center for Dealing with the Past in Croatia, and the Research and Documentation 
Center in Bosnia and Herzegovina29—discussed the prospects of an independent 
regional commission that would investigate and disclose the facts about war crimes 
and other serious human rights violations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.30 
By May 2008, these organizations had gained enough momentum and launched the 
Coalition for RECOM Initiative in Priština, Kosovo, with over 100 NGOs from the 
region.31  
 
Since the official constitutional meeting of the RECOM coalition in Priština in 2008 
the initiative has faced internal politicking and difficulties.  The driving coalition 
partners of RECOM, such as Documenta and the Humanitarian Law Center, in 
particular, have grappled with mobilizing coalition partners from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, after the head of the Bosnian Research and Documentation Center, 
for different reasons, refused to give his official support to the coalition at one of 
                                                 
28 The activities of the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade, Serbia, are a good 
example of documenting war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. The center also promotes 
victims rights, based on various initiatives, at http://www.hlc-rdc.org/stranice/Linkovi-
modula/About-us.en.html , accessed December 5, 2009.  
29 These various organizations have as their core mission to document and disclose 
facts about the human rights violations and war crimes committed during the 1990s to 
educate society and create a voice for victims. Various forms of implementing this mission 
exist. Documents, for instance, among other things, engages in commemorative culture, 
history teaching, and dealing with the past initiatives, thus emphasizing the interactive 
dialogue with society. The Research and Documentation Center, concentrates its work on 
documenting missing persons, and has published a comprehensive account of all the war 
victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Bosnian book of the dead (2009), as well as an 
interactive Google map that shows location, nature of the crime and number of victims. The 
Humanitarian Law Center, despite its involvement in commemorative culture, is known for its 
strong legal activities, providing support for victims in court and vis-à-vis state institutions. 
30  The International Center for Transnational Justice (ICTJ) and other prominent 
NGOs in the region also participated in this discussion. 
31  Coalition for RECOM, Report About the Consultative Process on Instruments of 
Truth- Seeking About War Crimes and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights in Post-
Yugoslav Countries, 2009, http://www.korekom.org/, accessed June 6, 2010. 
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the meetings in winter 2008.32 Void of an essential Bosnian member—BiH 
constitutes a symbolic member country due to its weighty history during the 1992-
1995 conflict—Humanitarian Law Center director, Nataša Kandic, managed to fill 
the gap created by the loss of the influential Research and Documentation Center 
by partnering with the Association of BiH Journalists.33 Yet, the fact that this 
organization did not essentially concentrate on war crimes reporting affected its 
legitimacy within the coalition, according to a prominent member of the initiative.34 
Critique has also come from participating organizations that deplored the lack of 
transparency in RECOM’s decision-making process.35 Moreover, the uncertain 
outcome of the commission and the long process in rallying financial and political 
support—both of which were fluctuating and vague—also led to a RECOM fatigue 
with each of the main partner organizations focusing their energy and resources on 
domestic and local programs in their respective home countries.36 In addition to 
internal obstacles, the initiative’s institutionalization process faced difficulties 
fueled by other political and international actors in the region. 
 
Although the political and institutional structures in the former Yugoslavia have 
become more favorable for the Coalition for RECOM Initiative in recent years, 
numerous obstacles still impede the creation of a fact-finding body.37 In the 
following I describe the fragile political progress across the region and outline some 
of the inherent problems. The first important political wave of change in the former 
Yugoslavia occurred in the early 2000s. Tudjman’s death in 1999 allowed the 
conservative nationalist era to end in which the narrative of the glorious homeland 
war to defend the young nation didn’t leave any room for discussion of war crimes 
and human rights violations. Serbia’s notorious leader Miloševic was booted out of 
power after his 2000 electoral defeat amid rising protests from the streets after he 
attempted to unilaterally remain in power.38 This reckoning with the past, however, 
was only the tip of the iceberg of a long process that is still ongoing.  
 
                                                 
32  See interview with Mirsad Tokaca, director of the Research and Documentation 
Center in June 2011. 
33  See interview with Nataša Kandic, director of the Humanitarian Law Center, in May 
2011. 
34  See interview with official member of Coalition for RECOM in Zagreb in February 
2011. 
35  B92, “NGOs Fall Out over Donations,” Život, June 30, 2011. 
36  See supra note 34. See also programs by Documenta, http://www.documenta.hr or 
the Humanitarian Law Center http://www.hlc-rdc.org, accessed November 23, 2010. 
37  Particularly during electoral campaigns, history is manipulated and old nationalist 
sentiments exploited by certain political parties or social groups. 
38  Sabrina Ramet, “Politics in Croatia Since 1990,” in Central and Southeast European 
Politics Since 1989, 2010, chap. 12 and 13. 
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Indeed, political leaders in both countries, Ivo Josipovic the president of the 
Republic of Croatia (who began his first term in February 2010), and Boris Tadic the 
president of the Republic of Serbia from July 2004 to April 2012, have both made 
important strides to foster a climate of rapprochement in the region. They represent 
a new political generation that has not been personally involved (be it directly or 
indirectly) in war crimes or the human rights violations of the 1990s conflicts.39 
More recently incumbent President of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolic, founder of the 
right-wing Serbian Progressive Party, might delay this process.40 
 
Interestingly, support from international organizations to create RECOM’s 
institutional framework also remains limited and further complicates human rights 
activists’ efforts to account for war crimes. While the Political Affairs Committee of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) released a report 
expressing its support for regional reconciliatory justice mechanisms among states 
of the former Yugoslavia, such as the regional fact-finding initiative RECOM41, other 
organizations, including the UNDP and the EU, among others, avoid public 
statements that engage in direct political or financial support of RECOM.42  
 
5. Early Grass-Roots Efforts: Local Consultations in Croatia and Serbia 
 
The process of gaining grassroots support for the campaign was the result of 
numerous consultations with local communities. Below, I draw on comments by 
participants of two of these consultation processes in order to sketch the evolution 
of the initial ideas and issues raised during the early stages of the campaign. After 
discussing these two cases, I illustrate the increasing local-regional gap during the 
later phases of the campaign between the movement organizers and local 
                                                 
39  In the 1980s, Josipovic was a member of the League of Communists of Croatia, 
playing a key role in the democratic transformation of this party as the author of the first 
statute of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) after Croatia’s independence. He left 
politics in the mid-1990s, pursuing his academic career as a law professor at the University of 
Zagreb and only reentered the political realm in 2003, when Ivica Racan, then acting Prime 
Minister, invited him to join the government. Serbia’s president, Boris Tadic, a trained 
psychologist, was part of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which was key in 
overthrowing Milosevic in 2000.  Politically part of the Democratic Party, he made multiple 
symbolic reconciliatory public statements that are a sign of collaboration and understanding 
of both countries.  
40  Dan Bilefsky, “Nationalist Wins Serbian Presidency,” New York Times (New York, 
May 20, 2012), sec. Europe. 
41  Pietro Marcenaro, Reconciliation and Political Dialogue Between the Countries of 
the Former Yugoslavia, Parliamentary Assembly Rapporteur Report (Council of Europe, 2011). 
42  See interview with United Nations Development Program and European Union 
officials in Sarajevo in May 2011. 
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communities. During one of the early consultations, organized on August 4, 200943 
in Knin, Croatia—a city situated in a region that many Croatian Serbs had to escape 
during the Croatian 1995-military intervention, Operation Storm—one of the 
pressing issues raised by participants was the ability of the RECOM Initiative to help 
establish a different version of the past. Revealing the ‘truth,’ as some of the victims 
participating at the roundtable phrased it, was one of the most important 
achievements they expected from the commission in order to counter the prevailing 
discourse of the Homeland war—patriotic nation-building war in which Croatian 
soldiers did not commit any war crimes but only helped defeat terrorists who 
threatened the young state’s territorial integrity, according to the official discourse 
of the Croatian government. 
 
Jovan Beric, a Serbian victim from Zadar, Croatia, believes in the RECOM movement 
as it can help to uncover perpetrators of different crimes. His comments underline 
his urge to reveal facts of past war crimes and atrocities: 
 
What do you have to talk to them about, they killed your parents, and you are sitting 
with them. […] That’s not how I think […] because I do not believe that every Croat is 
responsible for the crimes committed, but individuals, whose names are unfortunately 
not yet known. That is why I am looking forward to seeing this initiative up and 
running because I truly hope this can help name all war crime perpetrators, which will 
help us go in a better direction.44 
 
Participants at the consultation several weeks later in Kruševac, Serbia, on 
September 7, 2009, expressed similar opinions regarding the need to establish facts 
about the past. Miško Radonjic, a representative of a local NGO called Euro Contact 
underlined that: 
 
I personally believe that RECOM should only deal with the facts, that it should not 
even […] tackle the issue of causes, because that leads straight into politics, which will 
definitely create additional problems.45 
 
In fact, political groups, governments and other actors have continuously politicized 
many war-related issues across the region in the post-conflict Balkans.46 The 
                                                 
43  The organizers chose to hold the consultation meeting one day before the Croatian 
national holiday, Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Day of Croatian 
defenders, which honors Croatia’s veterans and is celebrated in Knin by the political 
establishment, the military, veterans and the public. The event is a very nationalist and 
conservative celebration of Croatia’s young nationhood. 
44  See RECOM consultation with the local community, Knin, Croatia, August 4, 2009. 
45  See RECOM consultation with the local community, Kruševac, Serbia, September 7, 
2009. 
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RECOM Initiative’s intention was to overcome this politicking. To this end, 
campaign members also wanted to reach out to a larger public. 
 
While many of the consultations with local communities centered on victims, the 
organizers of the RECOM campaign carefully drafted a strategy that would reach 
beyond this target group. Youths constituted a group on which members of the 
RECOM Initiative focused in particular. During the earlier consultation in Knin 
Emina Bužinkic a member of the Young People of Croatia Network thus emphasized 
the significance of engaging younger generations in a dialogue about past mass 
atrocities. According to her,  
 
It is very important to me to stress that young people want to know the facts. We 
want to know the truth; we want to be a part of the dealing with the past process. 
That is very important for us because it influences the way we are going to build our 
future. For us, this commission is important at the level of dealing with the past and 
learning about the events of the past. For us it is important at the level of transferring 
something to new generations.47 
 
These earlier consultations with local communities focused on fundamental 
principles of the commission’s mandate; yet, in some of the later consultations 
especially during 2010—such as the ones held by Documenta in Croatia’s rural and 
urban areas—the draft statute had grown into a relatively complex legal document, 
hampering the dialogue between the local community and the NGO activists 
promoting the RECOM Initiative. 
 
The case of a consultation meeting with civil society organizations in Osijek, 
Croatia’s third largest city that was heavily destroyed during the 1992-1995 war is a 
good case in point to emphasize the problem of RECOM Initiative members to cope 
with the regional-local divide. Put differently, while the organizers made an effort 
to be connected to their community at the base and to integrate local concerns into 
the regional project, these attempts were very difficult and did not always lead to 
the expected results.  
 
During the Osijek meeting on July 14, 2010, an elderly woman who was part of a 
one-person association in her village interrupted the formal discussion on provisions 
in the statute, in order to tell her story and experience of the war. After she 
explained to the participants that she had lost a family member and the missing 
person’s remains had still not been found yet, she pulled out a handmade photo 
album sharing pictures and memories of her loved one.  Her question to 
                                                                                                                 
46  Issues range from the manipulated and distorted accounts of the number of dead in 
the Srebrenica massacre in BiH to the involvement of politicians in war-related bribery 
scandals and arms deals. 
47  Ibid. supra note 44. 
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Documenta’s team evolved particularly around one issue: what would RECOM do 
for her and her personal situation? Could they initiate a process that would allow 
her to exhibit her photos and voice her cause across the nation? And would they be 
able to help her find the remains of her family member? While the official response 
of RECOM members supported her request, the conversation quickly turned back to 
more technical and abstract questions of the statute, leaving the woman’s concerns 
to the side. Yet, she was not the only one, questioning RECOM’s objectives. 
 
Other members also had troubles following the big-picture objectives of the 
campaign put forward by Documenta’s staff. Branislav Vorkapic, a representative of 
the Organization for Civil Initiatives in Osijek, raised his concern vis-à-vis the 
discussed goals:  
 
The longer I analyze this statute, the more confused I feel. I keep wondering if it is 
possible to create a diagram to reflect the stipulations of the statute to help us see 
the organization more clearly. For example, it says here that members will be 
professionally engaged individuals. […] What exactly is, then, the management 
mechanism? Who makes strategic decisions? Then, as I see further down in the text, 
there are these members and it is not clear where they belong according to this 
scheme. Then, there are investigation teams, and then there is this executive 
secretariat, which is further divided. Each of those segments has its leader, so to 
speak, and that segment is supposed to conduct a certain type of work. So, when I try 
to picture all of this, trying to understand the whole mechanism, I get confused.48  
 
Vorkapic’s concerns illustrate the growing disconnect between the movement’s 
early motivations of creating a victim-oriented institution and a non-judicial space 
for victims and those who suffered in order to complement existing retributive 
mechanisms. In fact, the complex structure of the organization—illustrated by the 
different organizational components of the Coalition for RECOM participants with 
its different working groups and the Council—is a consequence of the various 
contexts and interests the movement tried to integrate within its mandate. As a 
result, both examples above, the early 2009 consultations in Knin and Kruševac and 
the later ones in 2010, such as in Osijek, have revealed the troubles the main NGOs 
of the RECOM movement faced during the campaign to present the concept of a 
regional truth commission to local populations and incorporate the ideas at the 
grassroots level into the draft statute. As I will show below, this disconnect 
exacerbated over time. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48  See Local Consultation with Civil Society Organizations on the Draft RECOM 
Statute, July 13, 2010, Osijek, Croatia. 
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6. Finalizing the Statute: Swerving from a Bottom-Up to a State-Centric Approach  
 
In the final stages of drafting the RECOM statute, consultations intensified again on 
the national and regional level, and the discussed issues centered on state-related 
questions, including the commission’s interaction with the judiciary, the election of 
its members and its broader goals and assignments, among others.49 In the 
following, I draw on my participant observation of the 7th Regional Forum on 
Transitional Justice held in Zagreb, Croatia, from October 15-17, 2010 in order to 
highlight how the focus of the principal RECOM campaign members, notably the 
Humanitarian Law Center, have shifted from local, victim-oriented issues, to larger 
legal and state-centered questions.50 
 
Due to the limited time, several workshops about different sections and topics of 
the statute were organized simultaneously. Nataša Kandic, the director of the 
Humanitarian Law Center, headed the group discussing legal issues, especially the 
relations of the commission with the judiciaries across the Balkans, with the title 
“The Mandate of RECOM and its Authority with Respect to the Authority of National 
Judiciaries.” The organizers had set up the roundtable discussion for this group in 
one of the hotel's upstairs meeting rooms, with barely enough space for a few extra 
seats around the roughly 20 chairs placed along the oval-shaped conference table 
and a half-open translation booth with two interpreters sharing the tiny available 
space in one of the corners of the room.  
 
This sloppily organized workshop setting clashed with the lavishly catered and 
designed inaugural cocktail party the night before. Many participants and 
conference guests arrived at the workshop with some delay and the discussants had 
already started debating several issues in regards to different articles and 
paragraphs of the current draft statute. While some participants were crouching on 
top heaters in front of a large window with panoramic view of the city, a growing 
horde of interested individuals continued to pile into the room. Overwhelmed by 
the never-ending flow of people Ms. Kandic grew impatient with the crowd and 
advised the latecomers that it would be better to participate in one of the other 
workshop. She explained that this meeting would be less interesting for the press 
and the general public because the issues concerned many legal and technical 
details of the commission’s statute.  
 
                                                 
49  See for instance different working groups during the 7th regional form on 
transitional justice held in Zagreb, October 15-17, 2010.  
50  The overall data for these findings are based on participant observation and 
interviews of consultations held by the Coalition for RECOM Initiative from spring 2008 to 
summer 2011. Over 100 consultations were held during this period at the local, national, and 
regional level.  
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Despite a handful of baffled expressions by some individuals in the crowd about her 
boldness to send interested listeners out of the room, many of these seatless 
guests—who were either standing or leaning against the wall—remained in the 
room and followed the discussion. The participants sitting around the table mainly 
included lawyers, legal experts and practitioners, such as Nikola Bešenski, a judge at 
the County Court of Vukovar, Croatia (County Courts in Croatia have jurisdiction 
over war crimes), Velija Muric from the Montenegro Lawyers’ Committee for Human 
Rights, and Ibro Bulic from the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, among others. They addressed several legal concerns with the current 
statute. 
 
One of the issues raised during the workshop were perpetrator statements during 
hearings of the commission. The RECOM statute article on “Public Hearings of 
Victims and Other Persons” envisages public hearings to provide a space for victims 
to speak about their sufferings and their families’ sufferings. In addition, the article 
contains also a paragraph on the possibility of perpetrators who committed war 
crimes or serious human rights violations to testify on a voluntary basis. Such a 
clause, however, opens up a deluge of issues with regards to accountability and 
dealing with the past. The issues range from amnesty or immunity for the testifying 
perpetrator to judicial questions, such as whether the tasks of a commission would 
impede on the work of the judiciary in the region and/or to what extent the 
involvement of a commission could be complementary to the already existing 
retributive justice mechanisms. Ibro Bulic, Prosecutor at the Office of War Crimes 
Prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, raised his concerns with regard to the scope 
and tasks of the national judiciaries in this context, insisting that “we cannot invite 
perpetrators for questioning, or for deposition taking without the presence of their 
defenders.”51 His argument clearly reflected his consternation with possible 
violations of judicial procedures. As long as there was a guarantee to abide by the 
existing legal framework, testimonies of perpetrators could be integrated into the 
public hearings.  
 
The mandate and power of the commission vis-à-vis perpetrators was further 
discussed in the statute’s article on “Findings on Perpetrators,” which will be 
published after RECOM’s mandate ends, when it will provide a final report to 
governments and the public across the region. An early version of the draft that was 
circulated during the forum stated that: 
 
                                                 
51  See the 7th Regional Forum on Transitional Justice, Working Group: “The Mandate 
of RECOM and its Authority with Respect to the Authority of National Judiciaries, Zagreb, 
Croatia, October 16, 2010. 
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The Commission is mandated to indicate in its Final Report based on established facts 
whether an individual committed a criminal act of war crime or serious human rights 
violation. Such finding will have no impact on court decisions.52 
 
The wording this particular paragraph in the statute was subject to a very lively 
debate during the workshop. Participant Jasminka Biloš, a Croatian lawyer, for 
instance rightly wondered: 
 
Who will act on behalf of the Commission, who will be the competent individual to 
decide if the facts we have collected point to the criminal responsibility of an 
individual?53 
 
Representatives from international organizations, such as Ivan Jovanovic from the 
OSCE Mission to Serbia, however, did not question the RECOM’s authority in this 
regard. On the contrary, he underlined the great importance of the commission’s 
ability to point to alleged perpetrators in its final report: 
 
I think that RECOM must absolutely have it in its mandate to be able to indicate in the 
Final Report that an individual may have committed a war crime. Because if RECOM is 
only allowed to make a compilation of victims’ testimonies, the results of its work will 
be insignificant.54 
 
In the final draft statute that was eventually adopted by its members several months 
after the forum, the drafters slightly modified the initial text and harnessed the 
commission with a less powerful mandate with regards to what statements it could 
publish on alleged perpetrators. Its current version was printed as follows: 
 
The Commission may conclude in the Final Report that the established facts lead to a 
serious suspicion that an individual committed a war crime or other gross violation of 
human rights. Such findings shall not have the effect of a court decision and shall not 
prejudice the outcome of criminal proceedings, if any.55 
 
Ironically, during the debate Ms. Kandic underlined the importance of the Coalition 
for RECOM Initiative, notably because the retributive justice mechanisms in the 
former Yugoslavia and The Hague led to accountability efforts that ignored victims’ 
needs. Yet, the abstract and technical comments and discussion on legal questions 
of the commission during the workshop underlined the new direction the RECOM 
campaign had taken: less victim-centered and eager to find support from 
governments in the region. Regardless, the goal here was not to assess the 
normative value of NGO activists to build a momentum of states in the region 
                                                 
52  Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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endorsing the commission. Instead the collected data from my observations and 
interviews on this strategy highlights the dilemma activists were facing in order to 
establish alternative transitional justice mechanisms in the Balkans. 
 
7. Beyond Legalizing Truth Spaces and Future Research  
 
This article explored the struggle of domestic human rights activists to define the 
local meaning of international humanitarian law and transitional justice practices 
across the former Yugoslavia. I analyzed the development of NGO activists to 
increase their ‘invented’ space to foster deliberative spaces of justice for civil 
society. For this, I concentrated on the challenges of the legalistic influence on truth 
seeking and I investigated the ongoing political barriers to institutionalize 
alternative transitional justice instruments. Drawing on diverse consultation 
processes that I observed during my fieldwork in the region, I examined the current 
legalization of truth spaces to demonstrate how human rights activists attempted to 
embed their newly created space in the space originally provided by state 
institutions to depoliticize transitional justice efforts in the region. While the 
process of institutionalizing new truth spaces has remained unsuccessful, I showed 
that the state-centric strategy of human rights advocates also widened the gap 
between the activist leaders and the needs of their principal supporters, the victims. 
 
The legalization of truth spaces describes the process through which activists, 
practitioners, and experts employ tangible and practicable legal instruments during 
the consultation meetings in order to establish the mandate for the regional 
commission. There are a few broader conceptual implications of this process. 
Indeed, the institutionalization of truth-seeking bodies raises questions about the 
influence of hard justice, such as retributive mechanisms, on soft justice, such as 
restorative tools, including truth commissions, as mentioned earlier. The former is 
based on measurable results, notably the number of processed cases and rendered 
verdicts, whereas the latter, at least initially, have relied on outcomes which seem, 
at first, less quantifiable. Yet, sociologist and director of the Truth-Seeking Program 
at the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Eduardo Gonzalez – who 
has consulted and participated in many different local, national and regional 
initiatives around the world to set up commissions and bodies that deal with the 
past56 – has stressed the need to think differently when it comes to implementing 
successful strategies for truth commissions.57 The reason why judicial mechanisms 
are able to produce a quicker, and often – in terms of output such as the number of 
verdicts – more successful track record, is because law has turned the notion of 
                                                 
56 He also consulted the RECOM members during meetings in Serbia and Kosovo in 
spring and summer 2010. 
57 See interview with Eduardo Gonzalez on 10 September 2010 in Belgrade, Serbia. 
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justice into something tangible and applicable despite its disputable value and 
impact on a subject, in time and in space. 
 
As mentioned earlier, this research is original and important for the study of 
accountability after mass atrocity because it looks beyond the state-centric driven 
analyses of retributive justice, focusing on state-society relations in a post-conflict 
justice context instead. The combination of participant observation and narrative 
interviews, two qualitative research methods, provide suitable tools to tackle 
potential analytical and methodological challenges. As a case in point, thanks to 
participant observation I was able to trace and monitor human rights and judicial 
actors in different environments, such as conferences, meetings, trials and hearings, 
while they perform or discuss retributive and restorative justice practices or a 
combination of both. The other tool, formal and informal in-depth conversations 
with key individuals from human rights organizations, judicial institutions and 
governments, among others, complemented my observations.  As a consequence, 
this design allowed capturing and analyzing different, intersecting spaces and the 
role of key actors within these spaces to help understand current practices of truth 
and justice in post-conflict settings. This methodology also lends itself to other 
regional cases such as Africa, Asia, or Latin America. 
 
The notion of truth, however, cannot easily be quantifiable or be constrained in a 
body of legal texts.58 To this end, RECOM coalition members intend to create a 
large database, tracking cases and human losses across the region.59 Such a project 
is in line with policy strategies implemented by the UN ad hoc court—which has a 
large electronic database of its cases—and local institutions, such as the Bosnian 
state court, which has one of the most state of the art databases to document its 
cases and help the coordination between different judiciaries on the entity level in 
BiH.60 These observations are merely the beginning of a trend that transforms 
restorative practices into more concrete and result-driven projects. Projects, such as 
the work of Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) in Argentina, Latin 
America, confirm this trend. Funded by the Ford Foundation, CELS uses and 
populates large databases with trial information and analyses in order to spearhead 
collaboration between organizations across the Global South with the goal to 
elaborate best practices in transitional societies. Further comparative research on 
                                                 
58 Retributive justice mechanisms, however, have also a truth-disclosing component 
and therefore are considered by some as history-setting institutions. For a discussion on the 
history-defining capacity of the ICTY cf. Richard Wilson, “Judging History: The Historical 
Record of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2005): 908–942. 
59  See interview with RECOM coalition members in June 2011. 
60  See interview with Sven Marius Urke, secondee of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
and currently international advisor at the Bosnian High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council in 
May 2011.  
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these projects in the futures might help evaluate the consequences of this 
phenomenon for victims and post-conflict societies. 
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Appendix 1: List of Selected Organizations and Interviewees 
 
 
For confidentiality reasons the names of many interview participants do not appear 
in the list below. Instead their institutional affiliation is listed. 
 
Organizations 
 
BiH Court, Sarajevo. September (9-10 September 2009, 45-60 min. each) 
International and local judges and prosecutors 
Other Staff and representatives 
 
Belgrade District Court, Serbia. (15-16 September 2009, 45-60 min. each) 
Sinisa Vazic, President of the War Crimes Chamber 
Ivana Ramic, Media Spokesperson of the Court 
Bruno Vekaric, Deputy War Crimes Prosecutor  
Other Staff and representatives 
 
Center for Peace Studies, Zagreb, Croatia. (15-16 February 2011, 45-60 min. each) 
Gordan Bosanac 
Other Staff and representatives 
 
Croatian Disabled Homeland War Veterans Association (14 February 2011, 45-60 
min. each) 
Renato Selj, President 
Other Staff and representatives 
 
Delegation of the European Union to BiH. (17 May 2011, 45-60 min. each) 
Several leading country experts  
Other local staff  
 
Delegation of the European Union to Croatia. (17 February 2011, 45-60 min. each) 
Several leading country experts  
Other local staff 
 
Documenta Center for Dealing with the Past, Zagreb, Croatia. (September 2009 to 
May 2011, 10-90 min. each; repeated interviews) 
Vesna Teršelic, Director 
Eugen Jakovcic, Media Spokesperson 
Darija Maric, Regional Coordinator 
Other Staff and representatives 
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Muslim-Croat Federation's Veterans Association, Sarajevo, BiH (16 October 2010, 
30-45 min. each). 
Senad Hubijer, President 
Other Staff and representatives 
 
Research and Documentation Center, Sarajevo, BiH. 
Mrsad Tokaca, Director (17 May 2011, 60 min.) 
Lejla Mamut, Regional Coordinator (8 September 2009, 45 min.) 
Other Staff and representatives (8 September 2009, 30-60 min.) 
 
Humanitarian Law Center, Belgrade, Serbia. (September 2009 to May 2011, 30-60 
min. each, repeated interviews) 
Nataša Kandic, Director 
Sandra Orlovic, Deputy Executive Director 
Matthew Holliday, Outreach and Development Director 
Dragan Popovic, Program Director 
Lazar Stojanovic, RECOM Media Spokesperson 
Other Staff and representatives 
 
International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, United States. (April 2010 to 
March 2011, 30-60 min. each) 
Eduard Gonzalez, Director, Truth and Memory Program 
Several transitional justice and Balkans experts  
Other local staff and representatives. 
 
International Crisis Group, Sarajevo, BiH. (2-3 September 2009, 30-60 min each) 
Several Balkans experts  
Other local staff 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Hague, Netherlands. 
(5-9 November 2010, 30-60 min. each) 
Current and former judges and prosecutors  
Other staff and representatives 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Outreach, Zagreb, 
Croatia. (28 September 2010, 30-60 min. each) 
Several leading country experts  
Other local staff 
 
Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo, BiH. (28-31 August 2009, 45-60 min. 
each) 
Several leading country experts  
Other local staff 
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Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mission in Sarajevo, BiH. (10 
September 2010 and 12 May 2011, 60 min. each) 
Several leading country experts  
Other local staff 
 
Coalition for RECOM Initiative (September 2009 to May 2011, 10-90 min. each; 
repeated interviews) 
Coordination Council members 
Expert members 
Partner organizations including victims’ association and veterans’ 
organizations 
 
United Nations Development Program, Sarajevo, BiH. (16 May 2011, 60 min. each) 
Several leading country experts  
Other local staff 
 
Youth Initiative Croatia (21-24 May 2011, 45-60 min. each) 
Mario Mažic 
Other local staff 
 
Youth Initiative Serbia (20 May 2011, 45-60 min. each) 
Maja Mićić, Director 
Other local staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
